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Abstract: The paper shows how additional value can be created in 
maintenance collaboration through integrating the features of flexible 
asset management into maintenance contracts. We expand the 
traditional typology of maintenance contracts and introduce a new 
contract type, flexible asset management contracts. Also value 
sharing in the new contract type is discussed. Our logic for sharing 
the value is based on reaching for win-win situations in industrial 
maintenance collaboration. Finally, we present scenarios which prove 
that significant financial benefit can be achieved through adopting 
these novel contracts. In the dynamic and challenging operating 
conditions of the present, companies should actively search for this 
kind of possibilities for closer collaboration with their customers and 
suppliers. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper addresses combining the traditional understanding of 
maintenance contracts with flexible asset management thinking. 
Competition has become tight and globalised, and the number of 
outsourcings has increased. This has enhanced the collaboration between 
customer and supplier companies (Kroes and Ghosh, 2009; Yazici, 2012). 
Industrial maintenance service providers are forced to pursue higher profits 
for themselves and additional benefits for their customers. Therefore, 
maintenance companies are searching for novel contracts and services to 
offer (Martin, 1997; Wang, 2010). Companies can improve their 
performance through sharing more information with their supply chain 
partners (see e.g. Fantazy et al., 2011; Magnan et al., 2011). At the same 
time, companies must increase their adaptability in order to survive in the 
ever-increasing dynamism of the operating conditions (More and Babu, 
2011). This dynamism can be managed through strategic partnerships (Raut 
et al., 2012). One way of accomplishing these partnerships and hence 
adaptability is through flexible asset management (Gibson, 2000; 
Marttonen et al., 2011; Navarro, 2009; Ojanen et al., 2012; Sawhney et al., 
2009). 
Extensive collaboration in maintenance networks calls for new models 
and methods (Ahonen et al., 2010). So far, flexible asset management has 
not been considered from the maintenance contract perspective. By 
adopting this view, additional asset management services can be attached to 
the actual maintenance contract. The value sharing of these additional 
services has not been studied before, either. 
The goal of this study is to demonstrate the creation of additional value 
in maintenance collaboration by combining the research areas of flexible 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
asset management and maintenance contracts. Our research questions are 
the following:  
? How can the principles of flexible asset management influence the 
traditional understanding of the typology of maintenance contracts?  
? What are the strengths and weaknesses of flexible asset management 
contracts compared with traditional contract types?  
? How should the value be shared in flexible asset management 
contracts in order to reach win-win situations in maintenance 
collaboration? 
Our contribution to the existing literature is expanding the traditional 
typology of maintenance contracts. We also discuss the benefits of contracts 
with flexible asset management services, and present how the value of the 
additional services of these contracts can be shared in favour of win-win 
situations. The value sharing of the actual maintenance work is not 
addressed. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After the introduction, section 
2 discusses the literature of maintenance contracts and flexible asset 
management. In section 3, the research setting is presented. Next, a novel 
typology of maintenance contracts is introduced in section 4. In section 5 
we address the matter of value sharing in flexible asset management 
contracts. Section 6 offers scenarios on flexible asset management contracts 
in case companies, and summarises how companies can exploit the link 
between maintenance contracts and flexible asset management. The article 
ends with conclusions. 
 
2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Maintenance contracts 
 
The tightened competition and the emergence of outsourcings have caused 
many companies to increase collaboration with their customers and 
suppliers (Kroes and Ghosh, 2009; Yazici, 2012). Maintenance service-
providing companies are looking for new types of contracts to improve their 
profitability and provide additional benefits for their customers (Martin, 
1997). Wang (2010) states that service providers can pursue higher profits 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
by sharing the customer’s risks. We point out that previous literature 
considers mostly the perspective of the customer, while optimisation from 
the service provider’s point of view is unusual. Previous research shows that 
inter-organisational information sharing improves the performance in 
supply chains (e.g. Fantazy et al., 2011; Magnan et al., 2011). Holmström 
et al. (2010) state that information sharing enables new forms of 
collaboration – for example customers may outsource the ownership of 
physical assets.  
We introduce a new type of maintenance contracts, the flexible asset 
management contract. Essentially, the theoretical foundations of this paper 
are in the traditional agency theory (see e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hart 
and Holmström, 1987). However, we do not discuss the agency theory in 
detail in this paper. Instead, we focus on a more specific topic, contracts in 
the maintenance business. Accordingly, our reasoning is based on the 
explicit typology of maintenance contracts presented by Martin (1997). This 
widely cited typology includes three contract types: work package 
contracts, performance contracts, and facilitator contracts, also called lease 
contracts. In work package contracts, the service provider simply performs 
the tasks given by the customer. In performance contracts the service 
provider is typically also responsible for maintenance planning and 
organisation. The service company then agrees to provide the customer with 
a specific level of asset availability. Compared to work package contracts, 
performance contracts are more complex and require more trust between 
the contracting companies. The final contract type in Martin’s typology, the 
lease contract, means that the service provider owns the assets to be 
maintained. Thus the customer pays for using the assets, and the service 
provider is tied to their ownership. From the perspective of flexible asset 
management, this means inherent inflexibility. For example, the main 
benefit of lease contracts is usually seen to be the chance of decreasing the 
risks of the customer (e.g. Pongpech et al., 2006), although this may happen 
at the expense of the service provider.  
The viewpoint introduced for example by Teece (1988) assumes that 
each contracting party acts opportunistically. Of course, there is always a 
risk that opportunism incurs surprising losses for one or both of the 
companies (Vining and Globerman, 1999). As a solution, de Jong and Smit 
(2012) have introduced collaborative contracts, in which the objectives of 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
the contracting companies are congruent. By implementing flexible asset 
management contracts, these ideal collaborative contracts can be made 
more approachable.  
The liabilities in maintenance contracts have been discussed in previous 
literature. For example, the issue of who accounts for the success of 
maintenance in outsourcing situations has been studied (e.g. Hui and Tsang, 
2006; Levery, 1998). Multiple research gaps can be found in the traditional 
contract typologies, however. This is also acknowledged by Ahonen et al. 
(2010), who claim that novel tools are needed to promote the increasing 
collaboration in maintenance service networks. This point, although on a 
more general level, is also recognized by MacCarthy and Jayarathne (2012). 
Markeset and Kumar (2005) state that it has become more common for the 
service provider, not the customer, to own the physical assets. What remains 
quite unexplored, however, are the profitability impacts of the assets being 
included in the service provider’s balance sheet. Panesar and Markeset 
(2008) state that the conditions of the customer - service provider 
relationship must encourage the service provider to improve the 
performance of the customer actively. In general, the existing maintenance 
contract types have not succeeded in doing that. Jackson and Pascual (2008) 
have introduced a model for maintenance service pricing, but models for 
sharing the value of the accessory flexible asset management services in 
maintenance contracts do not exist. This is where we contribute to the 
discussion. 
 
2.2 Flexible asset management 
 
Today, dynamism is an essential part of doing business. In order to remain 
profitable, companies should somehow adapt to different operating 
conditions (More and Babu, 2011). Raut et al. (2012) emphasise the role of 
strategic partnerships in controlling dynamism. One way of advancing this 
is flexible asset management (Gibson, 2000; Navarro, 2009), where the 
amount of assets in a company’s balance sheet should follow the 
progression of changing demand. Considering a broader discussion, the 
importance of asset management for company profitability has been 
identified by several researchers (e.g. Aoudia et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2007; 
Tam and Price, 2008). Sawhney et al. (2009) point out that flexible asset 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
management is also significant in striving for a lean business philosophy. 
Companies have also recognised the importance of flexible asset 
management: in an international survey conducted by the European 
Federation of National Maintenance Societies (2011), 67% of the 
respondents thought that the flexibility of production assets is either 
significant or very significant.  
Previous literature has studied how to make fixed assets more flexible 
(e.g.  Kärri,  2007).  In  fact,  flexible  asset  management  has  traditionally  
mostly concerned fixed assets (Komonen, 2010) and long-term capital 
(Chiou et al., 2006). However, also current assets should be taken into 
account, for example by managing the company’s operational working 
capital. This is defined as inventories plus accounts receivable less accounts 
payable. In the maintenance business, the main drivers of working capital 
are spare part stocks and payment terms. Ojanen et al. (2012) highlight the 
importance of working capital in flexible asset management. Working 
capital management can have a significant impact on both company 
profitability and liquidity (Protopappa-Sieke and Seifert, 2011; Talha et al., 
2010). Grosse-Ruyken et al. (2011) and Randall and Farris (2009) 
emphasise the importance of managing working capital together with the 
supply chain partners. In inter-organisational maintenance collaboration, 
the role of working capital management is particularly important, as the 
amount of fixed assets is generally low in maintenance service companies 
(Marttonen et al., 2011; 2012). So far, working capital management has not 
been addressed very often in previous academic literature (Viskari et al., 
2011). 
In order to make the principles of flexible asset management more 
explicit, we present the flexible asset management model (the FAM-model) 
first introduced by Marttonen et al. (2012). The FAM-model combines 
aspects of asset management, profitability and financing. The model has 
been created through modifying the conventional formulas of the return on 
investment and the cost of capital. We use this model in our scenarios in 
section 6. The FAM-model can be presented as: ??? = ??????%? (??% ? ????)?????? + ???? + ??% = ?? ? ? + ?? ? ?? + ? , (1) 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
where ROI  is the company’s return on investment, 
EBITDA% is the proportion of the profit margin to the net sales, 
FA%   is the proportion of the fixed assets to the net sales, 
B  is the average depreciation time in years, 
CCC  is  the  cycle  time  of  operational  working  capital  in  
days, 
r is the residual which consists of other current assets 
and other current liabilities, 
iD  is the interest rate of company debt financing, 
iE  is the company return on equity, 
D is  the  amount  of  long-term  debt  in  the  company  
balance sheet, 
E is the amount of equity in the company balance sheet. 
 
The FAM-model perceives the ROI as a function of both fixed (FA%, B) 
and current asset management (CCC, r). In addition, from the perspective 
of the return on equity, the model can be presented as 
?? = ??????%? ???% ? ??????????? + ???? + ??% ? ?1 + ??? ? ?? ? ??. (2)
In equation (2) the principle of financial leverage is evident: by increasing 
the share of debt in its balance sheet, a company can improve its return on 
equity. Financial leverage, as well as the FAM-model, will be readdressed 
in the following sections. 
 
3 Research setting 
 
The new type of maintenance contracts, flexible asset management 
contracts introduced in this study are based on previous literature. We also 
address the logic for value sharing in these new contracts. It should be noted 
that the value sharing of the maintenance work itself is not discussed in this 
paper. Instead, we focus on sharing the value of the additional services of 
flexible asset management contracts. First, we introduce a theory of value 
sharing in the contracts, and then the theory is refined through a case study. 
Dubois and Araujo (2007) state that case research contributes extensively 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
to the research of purchasing and supply management, and according to Yin 
(2009), case research contributes to situations where “how” or “why” 
questions are studied, and when a deep understanding is needed of a certain 
phenomenon. These conditions are fulfilled in our research to a great extent. 
The research stages of the paper are presented in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1  The exploratory phasing of the paper 
 
The case companies chosen for this study were Metsä Fibre Oy and Botnia 
Mill Service Oy. Metsä Fibre is a well-known Finnish producer of pulp. 
Botnia Mill Service, on the other hand, provides industrial maintenance 
services almost exclusively for Metsä Fibre. Botnia Mill Service has been 
founded from the internal maintenance department of Metsä Fibre, and it is 
also partially owned by its customer. This means that the collaboration 
between these two companies is close and long-term. Hence, it is 
particularly justified to study the introduction of a very collaborative 
contract type between these companies, compared to average customer-
service provider relationships. In addition, Metsä Fibre represents the pulp 
industry, which is capital intensive. Asset management collaboration with a 
service  company  that  carries  a  light  balance  sheet  can  be  assumed  to  be  
fruitful.  
The case companies were studied through their financial statement data. 
The financial statements of year 2010 were used, as data from more recent 
years was not available. Using data from just one year can be considered 
reasonable, as we show how the new maintenance contract type can have 
an impact on the current profitability of the case companies. In 2010, Metsä 
Fibre had a net sales of 1,365M€, and a balance sheet total of 996M€. In 
Botnia Mill Service, the net sales were 54M€ and the balance sheet total 
20M€. The data of the case companies was used to create two different 
scenarios,  which  illuminate  the  sharing  of  the  value  of  the  additional  
services related to the flexible asset management contracts.  
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4 Combining flexible asset management and maintenance contracts 
 
Here we extend the typology of maintenance contracts by combining 
flexible asset management thinking with the typology of maintenance 
contracts presented by Martin (1997). We have incorporated some 
characteristics of flexible asset management thinking into the new contract 
type. These are: 
- Ownership of the fixed assets that the contract concerns 
- Ownership of the spare part stocks related to the contract 
- The impact of the payment terms on the profitability of the contract 
- The impact of financial leverage on the profitability of the contract 
The first two points about the ownership of assets and spare parts have 
already been discussed in the literature in the connection of pursuance of 
lease contracts. However, lease contracts tend to determine the service 
provider as the owner of the assets and spare parts. In our typology we strive 
for more flexibility, and thus in flexible asset management contracts the 
ownership can also be shared between the customer and the service 
provider. The third point concerns payment terms, which are present also in 
all traditional contract types. However, we would like to highlight the 
potential importance of the payment term decisions in the profitability of 
the contract. After all, operating with short payment times is a significant 
part of all lean business models. Finally, the impact of financial leverage 
should not be neglected when creating maintenance contracts. Gaining 
financial leverage can boost the profitability of the contract. For example, 
if a company chooses to carry additional assets in its balance sheet, 
financing these assets with debt can improve the company’s return on 
equity. 
The characteristics discussed above are the main features of flexible 
asset management contracts. The relation of the flexible asset management 
contract to the traditional contract types is presented in figure 2. The 
dimensions used in figure 2 are the amount of trust required from the 
customer-service provider relationship, and the complexity of the contract. 
Here we assume that the complexity of the contract type has a positive 
correlation with the costs incurred by creating and maintaining the contract.  
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
Figure 2  The novel typology of maintenance contracts 
 
An increase in the complexity of the contract type creates an increase in the 
potential benefits to be reached through the contract; in work package 
contracts the benefit is caused by the ability of the service provider to 
execute maintenance work tasks in a more cost-effective way, compared to 
the customer. In typical performance contracts the potential benefit is 
extended to include also the superior ability of the service provider to 
conduct maintenance planning and organising. In lease contracts the 
customer is usually released from the risk of owning the assets. However, 
we argue that the potential benefits of the lease contract are actually quite 
low. This is because the benefits can be great for the customer, but not so 
great for the service provider. In lease contracts the risks induced by the 
ownership of the assets are simply transferred from the customer to the 
service provider, which is not the optimal solution, at least from the point 
of view of maintenance collaboration.  
In order to maximise the collaboration benefit and to create a win-win 
situation, the risks should be balanced between the partners in flexible asset 
management contracts. We can conclude that, compared to traditional 
maintenance contracts, flexible asset management contracts call for more 
trust between the contracting parties. In addition, due to different terms of 
ownership, they are more complex, and hence more costly than the other 
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three contract types presented in figure 2. On the other hand, also the 
potential benefits are higher in flexible asset management contracts than in 
other types of contracts. This new type of maintenance contracts can create 
additional value for both the customers and the service providers through 
additional services, like asset ownership. Before making profit, however, 
the value created by the contract has to be shared between the contracting 
partners.  
 
5 Value sharing in flexible asset management contracts 
 
Here we address sharing the value created by the additional flexible asset 
management services discussed in the previous sections. The first challenge 
in the value sharing of a flexible asset management contract is fixed asset 
ownership. In the FAM-model (equation 1) it can be seen that the amount 
of fixed assets compared with the amount of company net sales (the FA%) 
has an impact on the ROI. Depending on the other parameters, as well as 
the initial level of the FA%, the change of the ROI caused by adjusting the 
FA% varies  across  companies.  In  order  to  share  the  value  of  the  flexible  
asset management contracts, we need the variable ?ROIFA%, defined as ??????% = ???(??%?) ? ???(??%?), (3) 
where  ?ROIFA% is the change of the ROI caused by an adjustment in 
the amount of fixed assets, 
     ROI(FA%2) is the ROI calculated with the adjusted FA%, 
     ROI(FA%1) is the ROI calculated with the initial FA%. 
 
In order to examine the impact of the FA% on the profitability in monetary 
terms, we must take the amount of invested capital into account. In the ROI, 
this invested capital consists of long-term debt and equity. The monetary 
change implies how much the profits should change for the company to end 
up on the same level of the ROI(FA%2), even though the amount of fixed 
assets remained unchanged.  
When  asset  ownership  is  shifted  from  one  company  to  another,  it  is  
possible that profitability decreases for the company that takes the asset into 
its balance sheet (company A), while profitability increases for the firm that 
gives up the asset (company B). In this situation, a fair value sharing calls 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
for pricing this “asset ownership service”. The price should be set 
somewhere between the losses of company A and the profits of company B. 
This way, both companies should gain from the arrangement. This logic of 
value sharing is presented in equation (4). ?????? ? (?? + ??) < ? < ????? ? (?? + ??) , (4) 
where    p  is the price charged by company A from company B 
for taking the ownership of the asset, 
       ?ROIA is the decrease of the ROI caused by the increased 
fixed assets in company A, 
       ?ROIB is  the  increase  of  the  ROI caused by the decreased 
fixed assets in company B, 
       DA is the amount of long-term debt in company A, 
       DB                      is the amount of long-term debt in company B, 
       EA             is the amount of equity in company A, 
       EB  is the amount of equity in company B. 
 
Depending on the context, the scale of the segment for an agreeable service 
price described by equation (4) can vary substantially. The larger the 
segment, the more untapped financial benefit is included in taking the asset 
ownership arrangements as a part of the maintenance contract. It is of course 
possible that an agreeable price does not exist, meaning that there is no 
value to be shared. This is the case when the decreased profits of company 
A are greater than the increased profits of company B, or when the profits 
decrease for both companies. When an agreeable service price cannot be 
detected, this service of asset ownership should be left out of the contract. 
It is also possible that both companies will reach an increase in their 
profitability through shifting assets from company B to company A. In this 
case the role of the service price is to share the profits between the two 
companies, using a logic which the companies have agreed on.  
Now we move on to discuss value sharing of spare part stock ownership 
and payment term alterations. These two aspects can be addressed together, 
as they both impact on the cycle time of operational working capital, the 
CCC, in the FAM-model (equation 1). The logic of sharing the value 
remains the same as above in the discussion about asset ownership. Once 
again we start by defining the impact of the agreement on the company ROI: 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
??????? = ???(????) ? ???(????) , (5) 
where   ?ROICCC is the change of the ROI caused by an adjustment in 
the cycle time of operational working capital, 
      ROI(CCC2) is the ROI calculated with the adjusted CCC, 
      ROI(CCC1) is the ROI calculated with the initial CCC. 
 
From this point on, the process of sharing the value is not unlike the process 
described for asset ownership agreements. Equation (4) is also suitable for 
pricing spare part stock ownership and payment term alterations. Again, the 
size of the segment for an agreeable service price determines the amount of 
potential financial benefits present in including the spare parts and payment 
terms in the maintenance contract. 
Finally, we discuss using financial leverage to improve the profitability 
of a maintenance contract. In the previous paragraphs the profitability 
changes were analysed through the ROI.  However,  the  impacts  of  the  
financial leverage are better to explicate through the return on equity, iE. 
When a company accepts additional assets, spare part stocks, or 
disadvantageous payment terms in its balance sheet, the financing of these 
items has to be organised. Presented simply, additional balance sheet items 
can be financed with either debt or equity financing. When deciding 
whether to use equity or debt, the impact of financial leverage on contract 
profitability should be studied. 
For the sake of simplicity, this analysis focuses on the financial leverage 
of company A, the company that takes additional items to its balance sheet. 
The financial leverage of company B is left for further research, since 
adjusting the company financing would be more complicated when giving 
balance sheet items away. In order to include the impact of financial 
leverage in the logic of sharing value, we introduce variable ?iEA: ???? = ???? ? ????, (6) 
where   ?iEA is the change of the iE caused by an adjustment in the 
capital structure of the company, 
       iEA2 is the iE calculated with the adjusted capital structure, 
       iEA1 is the iE calculated with the initial capital structure. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
Equation (4) must now be altered to take the monetary impact of the 
financial leverage into account. This can be done by including the ?iEA as 
well as the amount of equity in company A in the equation: ?????? ? (?? + ??) + ???? ? ?? < ? < ????? ? (?? + ??). (7)
Equation (7) concludes our theoretical reasoning about sharing the value of 
additional flexible asset management services. Next we demonstrate the 
benefits of these contracts through a case study. 
 
6 Findings of the case study 
 
6.1 Scenarios on flexible asset management contracts 
 
In this subsection we illuminate how the case companies could benefit from 
adopting flexible asset management contracts. Figure 3 summarizes the data 
collected from the financial statements of the case companies.  
 
Figure 3  Case company data used in the scenarios 
 
This subsection consists of two scenarios: a scenario of fixed assets and a 
scenario  of  working  capital.  The  first  scenario  is  about  fixed  asset  
ownership and financial leverage. Let us assume that Botnia Mill Service 
wishes to transfer a fixed, physical asset of 200,000€ from its balance sheet 
to the ownership of Metsä Fibre. Thus Botnia Mill Service represents 
company B discussed in the previous section, and Metsä Fibre stands for 
company A. Straight-line depreciations of ten years have been 
hypothesised. Table 1 shows the ROI-levels of the two companies before 
Metsä Fibre Botnia Mill Service
EBITDA%     33%
FA%               42%
B  9 years
CCC 44 days
r 30 days
ROI 44%
iD 7%
D 178,677,000€
E 671,042,000€
iE 54%
EBITDA%     10%
FA%               1%
B 2 years
CCC 18 days
r 45 days
ROI 52%
iD 0%
D 2,689,000€
E 6,970,000€
iE 71%
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
and after the fixed asset transfer, the following change in profitability, and 
the change in monetary terms. It can be concluded that transferring the fixed 
asset has profit potential: the profitability of Metsä Fibre would decrease 
with the extent equivalent to a drop of 1M€ in profits. Botnia Mill Service, 
on the other hand, would increase its profitability with nearly 2M€. Thus 
despite the initial losses of Metsä Fibre, there is enough value to be shared 
to reach a win-win situation. The net benefit is 899,294€ (1,938,492€-
1,039,198€). 
 
Table 1  Scenario on shifting fixed asset ownership 
 Metsä Fibre Botnia Mill Service 
ROI(FA%1) 44.02% 51.52% 
ROI(FA%2) 43.89% 71.59% 
?ROIFA% -0.12 percentage points 20.07 percentage 
points 
?ROIFA%*(D+E) -1,039,198€ 1,938,492€ 
 
Now we incorporate financial leverage to the simulation. Table 2 presents 
the return on equity of Metsä Fibre before and after the transfer of the fixed 
asset, as well as the change in both percentage points and monetary terms. 
The two columns show the situation when Metsä Fibre chooses to finance 
the asset with either debt or equity. It can be seen that the impact of financial 
leverage must not be neglected: in monetary terms the return on equity of 
Metsä Fibre would increase by over 70,000€ when using debt financing. 
Due to the heavy balance sheet of Metsä Fibre, even a small modification 
in the ?iE, expressed in percentage points, causes extensive changes in the 
?iE*E, expressed in monetary terms. It would definitely be advisable to 
finance the fixed asset with debt. Of course, this only holds when the 
profitability of Metsä Fibre is high enough to enable financial leverage 
instead of disadvantage.  
 
Table 2  Financial leverage of Metsä Fibre in the fixed asset scenario 
 Using debt financing Using equity financing 
iE1 53.6896% 53.6896% 
iE2 53.7006% 53.6867% 
?iE 0.011 percentage points -0.003 percentage points 
?iE*E 73,585€ -19,587€ 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
Adding up tables 1 and 2, the losses of Metsä Fibre would be 965,613€ 
(1,039,198€-73,585€) after taking financial leverage into account. 
According to equation (3), this is also the lowest agreeable price to be set 
for this particular service of asset ownership. On the other hand, the increase 
in the profitability of Botnia Mill Service equals additional profits of 
1,938,492€. This is thus the highest agreeable price for the service. The net 
benefits to be shared between the contracting companies equal the 
difference between the highest and the lowest agreeable price: 972,879€ 
(1,938,492€-965,613€).   
Our second scenario is about working capital management. It involves 
transferring spare part stocks from one company to another, adjusting 
payment terms, and using financial leverage in the process. We assume that 
the spare part stocks and payment terms are transferred in such a way that a 
sum of 3,300,000€ is taken off from the balance sheet of Botnia Mill Service 
(company B), and added to the balance sheet of Metsä Fibre (company A). 
This would change the CCCs  of  the  two  companies,  and  thus  also  the  
profitability. Table 3 shows the results of the working capital scenario, 
concluding that the arrangement would result in a monetary loss of nearly 
2,400,000€ for Metsä Fibre, but a monetary benefit of almost 2,600,000€ 
for Botnia Mill Service. This means that a win-win situation can be created 
through collaboration. The net benefit equals 212,740€ (2,581,943€-
2,369,203€). 
 
Table 3  Scenario on working capital management 
 Metsä Fibre Botnia Mill Service 
ROI(CCC1) 44.02% 51.52% 
ROI(CCC2) 43.74% 78.25% 
?ROICCC -0.28 percentage points 26.73 percentage 
points 
?ROICCC*(D+E) -2,369,203€ 2,581,943€ 
 
In table 4, the impact of financial leverage of Metsä Fibre on the contract 
profitability is presented. The benefit of using debt financing is over 
1,200,000€ for Metsä Fibre, which thus improves the profitability of the 
arrangement substantially. Again, using debt instead of equity is highly 
advisable.  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
Table 4 Financial leverage of Metsä Fibre in the working capital scenario 
 Using debt financing Using equity financing 
iE1 53.49% 53.49% 
 iE2 53.67% 53.44% 
?iE 0.18 percentage points -0.05 percentage points 
?iE*E 1,208,985€ -320,339€ 
 
After including the impact of financial leverage into the analysis, the losses 
of Metsä Fibre, expressed in monetary terms, are 1,160,218€ (2,369,203€-
1,208,985€). According to our logic of value sharing, this is the minimum 
price to be set for this particular service of owning spare part stocks and 
adopting the altered payment terms.  The benefits for Botnia Mill Service 
are 2,581,943€, which is also the maximum price for this additional service. 
The net benefits created through this kind of collaboration equal 1,421,725€ 
(2,581,943€-1,160,218€).  
Our scenarios are concluded with figure 4, in which the net benefits are 
presented for each of the two scenarios before and after taking the impact 
of financial leverage into account.  
 
Figure 4 Comparing the benefits of the two scenarios of flexible asset 
management services 
 
Fixed assets, benefits without financial leverage
Fixed assets, benefits with financial leverage
Working capital, benefits without financial leverage
Working capital, benefits with financial leverage
899,294€ 972,879€
212,740€
1,421,725€
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
When the impact of financial leverage is taken into account, the working 
capital management scenario seems more preferable for our case 
companies. However, the amount of capital to be shifted between the 
companies has been presumed to be 200,000€ in the fixed asset scenario, 
and 3,300,000€ in the working capital management scenario. Thus the large 
amount of capital has increased the role of financial leverage in the working 
capital scenario. It can be seen in figure 4 that the benefits of the working 
capital scenario are moderate without the financial leverage, compared with 
the fixed asset scenario. In fact, if the working capital scenario was 
conducted with the same amount of capital transferred between the 
companies than in the fixed asset scenario (200,000€), an agreeable price 
would not be found at all. Thus the value of this scenario depends on the 
large amount of capital to be transferred, which of course increases the risks 
of the contract.  
The fixed asset scenario, on the other hand, shows that including 
flexible management of fixed assets into the contract can create value even 
when the amount of capital to be transferred is quite small. The proportional 
impact of financial leverage is minor.  
 
6.2 Exploiting flexible asset management contracts 
 
The lessons learned from the case study are summarised next. Now it is time 
to examine how different companies can profit from a link between 
maintenance contracts and flexible asset management. Figure 5 shows a 
framework of how companies with a light or heavy balance sheet should 
create asset management collaboration to maximise their relative 
profitability. 
 
Figure 5 Framework of how different companies should exploit flexible asset 
management in their maintenance contracts to gain value 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
 
Maintenance service buyers usually carry heavy assets, compared with 
service providing companies. A specific monetary sum affects the relative 
profitability of these companies differently. As a result, transferring assets 
from the balance sheet of a service provider to the balance sheet of a 
customer creates a lot of additional value. On the other hand, transferring 
assets from a customer to the light balance sheet of a service provider often 
destroys value instead of creating it. It would thus be crucial for customer 
companies to be open-minded to extensive collaboration, instead of just 
advancing their own benefit in the short term. As we have shown, win-win 
situations can emerge from applying flexible asset management contracts, 
despite the ostensible losses incurred for the maintenance customer. 
In  general,  the  amount  of  fixed  assets  influences  the  relative  
profitability more than the amount of working capital. Thus, flexible 
management of fixed assets should be a priority. However, it needs to be 
noted that working capital management should not be neglected. Its 
influence on profitability depends on multiple parameters of a company. 
Integrating flexible asset management into maintenance 
contracts
Light 
balance sheet
Heavy 
balance sheet
The relative profitability 
of a contract can 
improve extensively
The relative profitability 
of a contract can change
only a little
COMPANY
RESULTS
COOPERATION
The role of 
working capital
is emphasised
The role of 
fixed assets is 
emphasised
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
The role of working capital is emphasised in companies which carry light 
fixed assets, for example in many service providing companies. 
Companies carrying heavy balance sheets need extensive transfers in 
order to alter their relative profitability either through an actual contract or 
financial leverage. High-value transfers increase the risks of the contract, 
and decrease its attractiveness. The impact of these increased risks on the 
contract profitability should be measured, but this issue is here left for 
further research.  
 
7 Conclusions 
 
We have contributed to the literature by introducing a new maintenance 
contract type, flexible asset management contracts. Compared to traditional 
contract types, these contracts have higher potential benefits, and a better 
potential to create win-win situations. It would be important for 
maintenance service providers and their customers to utilise these contracts: 
maintenance collaboration is developing rapidly, but so far the decision 
makers have lacked tools to manage nontraditional forms of collaboration.    
Through proper pricing, flexible asset management contracts can create 
significant financial benefits for both contracting parties. These contracts 
consider not just the perspective of customer companies, but also that of 
service providers. This is quite exceptional, as previous literature has mostly 
focused on the customer’s viewpoint. Instead of analysing the maintenance 
work itself, we have concentrated on the value sharing of the little studied 
issues of fixed asset and spare part ownership. 
We have learned that compared to working capital management, fixed 
asset management has a greater impact on profitability. Thus the first step 
for company managers is to analyse how much value could be created by 
transferring fixed assets to and from their balance sheets. After that, value 
creation through working capital management should be addressed.  
Our first research limitation is about using financial statement data and 
creating fictitious scenarios. Not many companies are ready to unveil their 
experiences with highly collaborative contracts. Thus researching these 
contracts with authentic case data must be left for further research at the 
moment.  We  have  also  studied  the  contracts  with  only  one  pair  of  case  
companies. This was justified, as including more companies would have 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
exceeded the scope of the article. Nevertheless, it is important to conduct 
future research on contracts with a more extensive group of companies. This 
way, the necessity of the contracts can be truly examined. The final research 
limitation concerns the scope of this article. Some essential issues were left 
for further research to keep the scope suitable. These issues include studying 
the financial leverage of the company extracting an asset from its balance 
sheet. We suggest that future research should include applying flexible asset 
management contracts with more than two contracting parties. The 
maintenance collaboration of today can involve three or more companies, 
which complicates the logic of value sharing to some extent. Also the higher 
risks and costs of creating and maintaining flexible asset management 
contracts, compared with traditional contract types, should be studied 
further. This way the profitability of these contracts can be estimated more 
precisely. We emphasise that to prosper in the future, companies should 
actively search for novel ways of collaborating with their partners. 
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